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NOTES AND COMMENT

instant case. He' quite properly draws attention to the great dissimilarity of facts between the two cases. In the Schwimmer case,
the applicant was a pacifist. Macintosh was not. In fact, he was
so far from being a pacifist that he served at the front in the World
War as chaplain, and later as head of an American Y. M. C. A. He
was simply unwilling to put allegiance to his country before allegiance
to his God. This is far removed from pacifism.
Looked at from a philosophical angle, a great deal might be said
about this case. From a legal point of view, little can be said beyond
what may be found in the very exhaustive opinions in the case.
Whether wisely or not, the court is now definitely committed to
strict, unyielding naturalization requirements.
It may, however, be remarked that it is strange and not a little
surprising that the court should so painstakingly seek technicalities
and unnecessary implications in order to exclude a person of such
unquestionable moral qualifications for citizenship. It was ably pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the minority, that if
a man so highly desirable as a citizen is to be excluded, "the disqualification should be found in unambiguous terms and not in an
implication which shuts him out and gives admission to a host far less
worthy."
True, if the great mass of citizens in the United States were suddenly to entertain the same philosophy as Macintosh, and if all these
persons were to conclude, even mistakenly, that a certain war was
unjust, the United States might be placed in an embarrassing situation. This country might find itself unable to prosecute even a
necessary war. But obviously such situation is impossible practically, since the great mass of citizens will always as they have in the
past, continue to support their country right or wrong. This assumed situation, then, being impossible, it is doubly difficult to see
why Macintosh was denied citizenship, since it is elemental that the
law is not based upon impossibilities.
M. WESLEY KUSWA.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

EMINENT

In City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Electric Ry and Light
Co. 238 N. W. 377 (Wis.) the Supreme Court denied a motion for
rehearing on injunction imposed on the defendant Company from
operating cars used exclusively for the transportation of freight upon
plaintiff's streets, as designated by the franchise of March, 1906. By
that franchise the Milwaukee Northern Ry Co., the defendant's predecessor, was authorized to operate on designated streets in City of
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Milwaukee interurban cars which are used primarily-yet -not necessarily exclusively-for passenger service. Although the defendant
Company was granted two three-months trial periods in 1928, the
court was of the opinion that this was not a consent to the enlargement of terms of the franchise, and hence by subjecting the prop-'
erty to this added burden, without compensation to the abutting
owners would be unconstitutional.
In Article 1 Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution is preserved
inviolate the right of the individual to possession of property, for
"the property of no person shall be taken for public use without just
compensation therefor." It is a fundamental tenet that the question
of the necessity for taking lands for public use by right of eminent
domain, and the extent and manner of its exercise, are questions of
policy which belong to the legislature. Since the legislature is the
sovereignty from which power emanates, it may delegate the exercise
of such powers to municipal corporation or municipal officers. Wis.
consin Water Co. v. Winans 85 Wis. 26, State ex rel. Baltzel v. Stewart 74 Wis. 620, Smeaton v. Martin 57 Wis. 364, Smith v. Gould 59
Wis. 631.
Having acquired private land for public use, and dedicated it to
public travel, the city may grant a franchise to a common carrier for
hire to subject certain designated streets to ordinary surface street
railway service. Although such a franchise also grants the right to
erect poles to support the overhead trolley wires, which poles are
set near the outer edge of the sidewalk-with due regard to the
property owner's convenience-it is not an additional burden upon
the fee, but an improved method of using the street for its original
purpose, namely public travel. Hobart v. Milwaukee City Ry Co. 27
Wis. 194, State ex rel. Attorney General v. Madison St. Ry Co. 72
Wis. 612, La Crosse City Ry Co. v. Higbee 107 Wis. 389, City of
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Electric Ry and Light Co. 173 Wis. 400.
In the instant case, although modern conditions demand a greater
elasticity than granted in the 25 year old franchise, the court declares that using these ordinary surface street railway tracks (which
were erected for the purpose of transporting persons from place to
place on such streets at their convenience) for a certain number of
cars used exclusively for freight does impose an additional burden
upon the fee. The court refuses to enlarge the scope of eminent
domain when it says, "Courts cannot by interpretation enlarge rights
conferred upon street railway by municipal ordinances or subject
private property to additional burdens without consent of, or compensation to, the owner, although changes in transportation condition
may warrant additional grant."
CHARLES A. RIEDL.

